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Chapter 2
Benefits and Productivity
William E. Even and
David A. Macpherson
Private sector employees now receive over one-quarter of their entire com-
pensation in the form of employee beneWts, and in large Wrms the fraction
is even higher. The generosity and structure of these beneWt programs in-
Xuences workers’ productivity in numerous ways. One reason is that work-
ers are heterogeneous in terms of their willingness to trade wages for
beneWts. As a result, any given Wrm’s beneWt package will attract and retain
a nonrandom group of workers. Another reason is that employee beneWts
can alter lifetime earnings proWles. As a consequence, they can be used to
alter employee retention rates and vary worker incentives for retirement. 
This chapter discusses how two of the most prominent employer-provided
beneWts — pensions and health insurance plans — inXuence productivity.
In particular we investigate how pension plan design and the availability of
employee or retiree health insurance inXuence workforce selection, reten-
tion, retirement behavior, and worker effort. Drawing from available evi-
dence, we examine trends in these beneWts, and explore how they might
alter future workplace patterns. 
Changes in Pension Structure and Design
In the North American labor market, employers offer several different types
of pension plans. DeWned beneWt (DB) plans generally promise a life annu-
ity at retirement, the amount of which usually depends on earnings, years of
service, and some generosity rate. For example, a DB plan could provide a
beneWt equal to 1 percent of Wnal average salary per year of service, where
Wnal average salary is computed using the worker’s three highest years of
earnings. DB plans have minimum service and/or age requirements for
the immediate receipt of beneWts on departure for the Wrm. For example,
a plan might require that the worker be either sixty-Wve years of age or
have at least thirty years of service. If a worker does not satisfy the age and
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service requirements for full beneWts, the plan may allow the worker to col-
lect reduced beneWts for an early retirement (see Mitchell this volume).
In a deWned contribution (DC) plan, the employee usually contributes a
percentage of salary into a pension plan, and the employer may provide a
match. The pension assets may be managed by a pension fund manager, or
may be self-directed by the employee. On vesting, the plan participant earns
a legal right to the plan balance. In the subset of plans known as 401(k) pen-
sions, participants may elect how much of their salary they want to contribute
to the pension. Relative to traditional DC plans, 401(k)s have the advan-
tage of giving employee the ability to contribute pretax dollars to the plan. 
In recent years a newer form of pension has been devised in the United
States, known as a cash balance plan, sometimes referred to as a “hybrid.”
This has both DB and DC features, since the employee is credited with a
Wxed percentage of pay annually and guaranteed a rate of return on the
account balance. The cash balance plan is similar to a DC plan since a par-
ticipant’s return is generally linked to a market-based prevailing interest
rate (such as the Treasury bond rate). On the other hand, all employee con-
tributions are pooled into a single investment account, and employees have
a claim on the fund equal to prior contributions plus investment returns
promised by the plan. As a result, the plan has a DB-like feature: at any
given point in time, the plan could be over- or underfunded.
The Changing Composition of Pension Offerings
In the last two decades, DB plans have become much less popular in the
United States, while DC plans, particularly the 401(k) plan, are increasingly
common (Mitchell this volume; EBRI 2001). Several explanations for this
shift have been offered, including higher administrative costs in DB plans;
employment shifts across industries and from large to small Wrms; a decline
in unionism; the rise of 401(k) plans; workers’ interests in having more
portable pensions; and Wrms’ interests in having pensions encourage later
retirement. 
Several analysts have investigated whether employment shifts can account
for the long-term shift in the United States from DB to DC plans (Gustman
and Steinmeier 1992; Clark, McDermed, and Trawick 1993; Kruse 1995; and
Ippolito 1995). The preponderance of the evidence is suggests that about
half of the shift can be accounted for by economic restructuring — that is,
by industrial shifts in employment, the decline in unionism, and the move-
ment from large to small Wrms. It also appears that most of the shift during
the 1980s was not the result of DC plans being formed to replace terminated
DB plans. Rather, most new DC plans emerged at Wrms that did not previ-
ously offer a pension plan. During the 1990s, however, it appears that termi-
nated DB plans were replaced by 401(k) and other DC plans (Papke 1999).
One reason that 401(k) plans took off was that clarifying regulations were
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issued by the Treasury Department in 1981 permitting their growth. Over
the last twenty years, they continued to grow because they allow employees
to contribute pretax dollars. Moreover, evidence now suggests that 401(k)
plans have better-targeted selection and retention effects than other pen-
sion types (Ippolito 1997), a point we return to below. 
The conversion of traditional DB plans to cash balance plans has
attracted a good deal of media and legislative attention in recent years. The
cash balance plan was Wrst created by Bank of America in 1985 (Clark and
Schieber 2000). Initially, only a few companies copied this new type of pen-
sion, but by 1997, 6 percent of workers covered by DB plans in the private
sector were in cash balance plans (Ippolito 2001). While this is a relatively
small fraction of all covered workers, it was nearly double the coverage rate
for cash balance plans found two years earlier. Since cash balance plans
are virtually identical to DC plans, some of the explanations for the growth
of DC plans can be used to explain why a Wrm would want to convert to a
cash balance plan (i.e., increased portability and encouraging later retire-
ment). An important question is why a Wrm would convert its DB plan to
a cash balance plan instead of starting a new DC plan. One explanation is
that terminating a DB plan and replacing it with a DC plan could have tax
consequences that could be avoided by conversion to a cash balance plan
(Ippolito 2001). Legislation passed in 1986 imposed a 10 percent excise tax
on a reversion of assets from an overfunded DB plan, a tax rate increased
to 15 percent in 1988, and to 50 percent in 1990. If a Wrm has an over-
funded DB plan and wanted to switch to a DC plan, it would now have to
pay the 50 percent reversion tax when it terminated the DB plan. On the
other hand, if it simply converted to a cash balance plan, there would be no
reversion of excess assets, yet now the Wrm has essentially established a DC
plan and avoided the reversion tax. 
Effects of Changing Pension Design on Selection and Retention
We illustrate how the switch from DB to DC plans affects various dimen-
sions of productivity; the time path of wealth accrual in the two plans types
may be compared. In a DB plan, the pension value at a particular age can
be computed as the present value of the life annuity that the worker would
receive if she terminated employment with the Wrm at that age. In a DC
plan, the value of the pension at a particular age is simply the account bal-
ance determined by prior contributions plus accumulated interest. Given
speciWc assumptions regarding plan parameters, these values can be com-
puted explicitly. Following the U.S. Department of Labor (1999) data for
medium and large establishments, we note that 95 percent of DB plans offer
an early retirement option, with an average early retirement reduction factor
of 4.9 percent per year. The most popular normal and early retirement ages
are 65 and 55, respectively, and the average generosity rate is 1.5 percent
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per year of service. We use these parameters for our benchmark DB plan.
In addition, the benchmark worker is assumed to begin employment with
the Wrm at age 35 at a starting salary of $30,000. Both the nominal interest
and wage growth rates are assumed to equal 6 percent. Under these assump-
tions, the contribution rate required in a DC plan to create an identical
amount of wealth at normal retirement age is 14.6 percent. 
Pension wealth is plotted for this hypothetical worker between ages 50
and 75 in our benchmark DB and DC plans in Figure 1. Since the contri-
bution rate of the DC plan is chosen to generate the same level of pension
wealth in the DB plan at age 65, the DB and DC wealth lines intersect at age
65. For a departure at any age other than 65, DB wealth is lower than DC
wealth. This emphasizes the fact that, relative to DC plans, DB plans penal-
ize early or late retirements. 
An alternative way of comparing the incentives in DB and DC plans is to
examine the rate at which pension wealth accumulates over time. We deWne
pension accrual as the increase in pension wealth from one year to the
next, subtracting out interest that is earned on the prior year’s balance.
Then the pension accrual rate is computed by dividing pension accrual by
the worker’s salary in that year. Figure 2 compares the pension accrual rates
in our benchmark DB and DC plans. The accrual pattern in the DC plan
is Xat, as it equals the contribution rate assumed Wxed over the worker’s
career. By contrast, in the DB plan, the accrual rate starts out low, rises until
the normal retirement age, and then drops after the normal retirement age.
In this particular comparison, the accrual rate in the DB plan is less than
that in the DC before age 55 and after age 65. After age 55 and before age
65, the DB has the higher accrual rate. 
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Figure 1. Stylized pension wealth patterns, deWned beneWt and deWned contribution
plans. Source: author’s calculations.
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If the worker leaves at any age other than age 65, he has less pension
wealth accumulated in a DB than a DC plan. The difference between DB
and DC wealth at a particular age has thus been referred to as a “capital
loss” in the literature (Gustman and Steinmeier 1995). Early retirement
provisions can reduce the capital loss for early retirees. The capital loss for
the DB plan, with and without an early retirement provision, is illustrated
in Figure 3. Here the DB plan capital loss rises from zero at age 35, to its
peak at slightly over 1.5 times salary at age 51. Between age 51 age 65, the
capital loss drops to zero. After age 65, the capital loss begins to rise again. 
Because the DB and DC plans generate such different wealth accumula-
tion proWles, they have the potential to affect workforce productivity in sev-
eral ways. SpeciWcally, relative to the DC plan (or a cash balance plan), the
DB backloads pay and thus penalizes workers that leave prior to retirement.
This has selection, retention, and direct productivity effects (Gustman,
Mitchell, and Steinmeier 1994). The selection effects of a pension refer to
the effect of the pension on the type of workers that are drawn to the Wrm.
Retention effects refer to the impact of the pension on the chance that the
worker quits. 
Compared to a DC plan, a backloaded DB plan will be more attractive
to workers who expect to stay with the Wrm for a long period of time. For
example, women with below-average quit rates tend to work at Wrms with
pension plans (Even and Macpherson 1990). Also Wrms with a pension
(particularly a DB plan) are more attractive to workers with low discount
rates, compared to Wrms without any pension.1 The fact that pensions
may attract low discounters suggests that they can attract workers who have
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Figure 2. Stylized pension accrual rates, deWned beneWt and deWned contribution
plans. Source: authors’ calculations.
03chap2.qxd  1/8/03  10:28 AM  Page 47
a greater chance of being promoted, receive higher job performance rat-
ings, and are less likely to call in sick (Ippolito 1997).
Though theory suggests that DB plans do more to retain employees than
DC plans, this has proven difWcult to show empirically. Thus in practice,
workers with DB and DC plans have virtually identical turnover (Gustman
and Steinmeier 1995; Even and Macpherson 1996). One explanation is
that Wrms offering pensions might pay above-market or so-called “efWciency
wages,” so the high wages might dominate the backloading effect of DB
plans. An alternative explanation for the DC effect on mobility might be
that DC plans attract low discounters and low discounters are less likely to
quit. The fact that new employees who do not participate in their company’s
401(k) plan are more likely to quit supports this view (Kusko, Poterba, and
Wilcox 1994; Ippolito 1997; Even and Macpherson 2001). This is consistent
with Ippolito’s (1997) theoretical model, which indicates that Wrms offer-
ing DB plans do a better job of stopping high discounters from accepting
employment at the Wrm. Firms with DC plans do a better job of encourag-
ing high discounters who are hired, to eventually quit. 
Compared to traditional DC plans, a 401(k) pension has the potential to
create yet distinct selection and retention effects. For example, in a tradi-
tional DC plan the employer contributes a Wxed percentage of pay into
the plan, whereas in a 401(k) plan the employee chooses how much to
contribute and the employer provides a matching contribution. The 401(k)
plan will be more successful at encouraging high discounters (less produc-
tive) workers to leave the Wrm since they will not value employer matching
contributions. As a consequence, even though the Wrm may not be aware of
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Figure 3. Capital loss in deWned beneWt plans with and without early retirement
incentive feature. Source: authors’ calculations.
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which workers are actually high discounters, it is able to pay them less and
encourage them to leave. 
In addition to selection and retention effects, the switch to DC plans can
also affect worker productivity by inXuencing monitoring costs and worker
effort. For instance Lazear (1979) proposes that backloaded pay may be
used to conserve on monitoring costs, arguing that workers shirk less when
they are subject to a pension capital loss if they are dismissed. The evidence
does support this view, in that DB plans appear to enhance productivity
by 5 to 8 percentage points more than DC plans (Dorsey, Cornwell, and
Macpherson 1998). 
DC plans can also have other effects, potentially enhancing productivity
by using company stock to tie worker compensation to Wrm proWtability.
There are numerous ways to make company stock part of the DC plan
(Wiatrowski 2000). Employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) are the most
obvious mechanism, but employers also do this in other ways by provid-
ing matching contributions in 401(k) plans that take the form of company
stock. Alternatively, a company can give employees the option to choose
how their pension funds are invested and make company stock one of
the choices. Yet another possibility is to include a stock purchase plan that
allows employees to purchase company stock at a discount, or to provide a
stock option plan, in either a qualiWed or nonqualiWed vehicle. 
Two areas of research shed light on the extent to which employee stock
ownership can enhance productivity: ESOP and executive compensation
studies. In studies comparing ESOP with non-ESOP Wrms, most research
reports Wnding the ESOP Wrms averaging 6.2 percent higher productivity
(Blasi, Conti, and Kruse 1996). However, there is some evidence that such
productivity effects are relatively small for larger companies, potentially
reXecting free-rider problems. There is also a substantial body of research
studying executive compensation in the United States, where much of the
deferred compensation takes the form of company stock or stock options.
The CEOs of the largest 500 industrial companies received approximately
35 percent of their compensation in the form of stock options in 1996; this
was nearly 10 percentage points higher than observed four years previously
(Murphy 2000). Several studies report positive effects of executive stocks or
stock options on company performance, indicating that companies offering
long-term incentive plans exhibited greater increases in return on equity
than those without these plans (Leonard 1990; Murphy 1999; Abowd and
Kaplan 1999). 
While executives have long received compensation that is linked to com-
pany performance, the growth in DC plans now extends contingent com-
pensation down to more levels of employees. Recent research indicates that
if workers have company stock as an investment option in their 401(k) plan,
approximately one-third of the assets were held in the form of company
stock (VanDerhei, Holden, and Quick 2000). If the employer controlled the
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investment choice of at least part of the participant balances, slightly over
one-half of the assets were held in company stock. In addition, stock option
plans are now offered to rank-and-Wle employees, presenting yet another
means of linking pay to company performance.
Nonmanagerial/nonprofessional employees are relatively unlikely to have
stock option plans — available in only about 10 percent of publicly traded
companies — but nearly one-half of the plans existing in 1998 were either
expanded or added since 1996 (Lebow et al. 1999). These plans not only
tie compensation to Wrm performance, but they also defer compensation by
restricting the exercise date on the option to some point in the future. Of
course a concern about linking pay and performance is that holding pen-
sion assets in employer stock reduces portfolio diversiWcation and may sub-
ject employees to increased investment risk. In addition, if employees are
heavily invested in company stock, companies may Wnd it difWcult to shed
workers when proWtability is low. 
Effects of Changing Pension Design on Retirement Outcomes
Another way pensions can inXuence workforce patterns is via their retire-
ment incentives. As the DC-covered worker approaches retirement, his pen-
sion accrual rate tends to be constant; by contrast in a DB plan, the accrual
rate varies depending on the plan’s early and normal retirement age provi-
sions. Relative to a DC plan, a DB plan creates incentives to retire some-
where between the early and normal retirement age. The observed national
switch to DC plans may therefore make it more difWcult for Wrms to fore-
cast labor force retirement patterns. Another issue is that of late, Wrms offer-
ing DB plans appear to have adjusted beneWt formulas to reduce retirement
incentives, relative to DC plans. For example, the fraction of percentage of
DC-covered employees having a cost-of-living increase over the past Wve years
dropped from 41 percent in 1985, to 4 percent in 1995 (U.S. Department of
Labor various years). This decline might reXect the slowdown of inXation,
but reduced cost-of-living adjustments do encourage workers to retire later. 
Among DC plans, the growth of 401(k) plans might also inXuence retire-
ment age patterns. One reason is that, relative to traditional DC plans, low-
income workers save less in 401(k) plans, whereas middle and high income
workers tend to be saving about the same (Even and Macpherson 1998).
In addition, having 401(k) plans increased the variance of pension assets
across workers, largely because of higher variance in contribution rates.2
The greater variation in retirement asset accumulation will probably pro-
duce greater variation in retirement ages.3
Another important change in pension design is the effect of rate of return
risk on the accumulation of pension assets. With DB plans, the rate of growth
in pension assets is driven by variations in wage growth. In DC plans, vari-
ations in the rate of return on pension assets are important. In 401(k)
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plans, workers are frequently given control over the asset allocation of
their pension accounts. Holden and VanDerhei (2001) estimate that three-
quarters of 401(k) assets are held, directly or indirectly, in equity securities.
Since workers in DC and 401(k) plans are exposed to greater rate of return
risk, retirement behavior may become more sensitive to the performance
of equity markets. Thus if equity markets perform poorly, the resulting
wealth loss could prompt workers to defer retirement. Moreover, if workers
have invested heavily in their employers’ stock, their retirement wealth
becomes closely tied to the Wrm’s performance. When the Wrm is faced with
declining demand and proWts, stock prices drop and workers are less able
to retire. This makes it more difWcult for Wrms to shed workers through vol-
untary retirements when proWts are falling (Rappaport this volume).
Changes in Employee Health Insurance Offerings
The percentage of U.S. workers with employer-provided health coverage has
fallen in the last two decades, from 83 percent in 1980, to 71 percent in
2000. Additionally, workers with employer-provided health insurance are
paying a larger share of the premium: covered workers who must pay some
fraction of the premium rose from 56 percent in 1980, to 74 percent in
2000 (authors’ tabulations of March Current Population Surveys). Addi-
tional evidence on employees of medium and large Wrms indicates that
those having to pay part of the cost of single coverage rose from 36 percent
to 69 percent between 1985 and 1997, and the percentage contributing
toward the cost of family coverage rose from 56 to 80 percent over the same
period (U.S. Department of Labor various years). 
Undoubtedly, rapidly escalating health insurance costs are part of the
explanation for declining health insurance coverage rates and increased
employee contributions toward coverage. These changes in health insur-
ance beneWts will have selection and retention effects that could have both
positive and negative effects on Wrm proWts. Of course, employer-provided
health insurance is likely to be most attractive to workers with health prob-
lems, risk averse workers, and workers with low discount rates. As yet, how-
ever, there is no empirical evidence demonstrating how the selection effects
of employer-provided health insurance coverage might work, in terms of
discount rates or risk aversion. 
By contrast, there is a long literature establishing the fact that Wrms
offering health insurance tend to draw less healthy workers (Cutler and
Zeckhauser 2000). One interesting feature of employer-provided health
insurance is that, like DB pensions, it provides a means to backload pay. If
Wrms require all workers to contribute an identical dollar amount for health
insurance (either implicitly or explicitly), they effectively reward older
workers with a more valuable beneWt. For example, data from three private
insurance carriers reveals that the typical health insurance premium is 3.5
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to 4.0 times higher for a 60-year-old than for a 30-year-old, and the annual
cost of the plans is between $2,100 and $3,500 higher for the 60-year-old
(<www.ehealthinsurance.com>). Health insurance coverage also rewards
men and women differentially: at young ages, private insurance markets
charge higher rates for women. At older ages, the reverse is true. Differen-
tial usage and differential premium charges also reward married and single
people differentially: many employers charge employees less than the mar-
ginal cost of family coverage and thus favor married workers, particularly
those with large families. If all employees contributed the same dollar
amount for coverage, offering health insurance would select and retain
older workers, workers with families, and workers without coverage from
a spouse. Retention of unhealthy workers will be exacerbated by the fact
that many insurance plans do not cover preexisting conditions, resulting
in what has been called “job lock” in the literature. One study found that
employer-provided health insurance cuts voluntary turnover by 25 percent
(Madrian 1994).4
As the cost of health insurance has risen over time, these selection and
retention effects will become more pronounced. Increased heterogeneity
in the workforce, along the lines outlined by Riche (this volume), may also
amplify the effects. For example, as the fraction of workers with spouses that
also have coverage increases, workers will place less value on employer-
provided subsidies for family care, and the Wrm will have greater difWculty
in attracting and retaining such employees. If Wrms Wnd these selection
and retention effects of health insurance undesirable, they can dampen the
effects by charging extra for family and/or individual coverage, which may
explain the trend toward larger percentages of employees having to pay for
health insurance costs, as noted above.
A new model recently arrived on the health insurance scene is the “de-
Wned contribution” health insurance plan as distinct from the traditional
“DB” approach to health plans (EBRI 2000). In the old model, employers
elected a health insurance plan and assumed the risk regarding premium
Xuctuations. In a DC health insurance model, the employer typically
promises to contribute a Wxed dollar amount toward the health plan, and
the employee must pay for any cost in excess of the employer contribu-
tion. Employees are usually offered a menu of health insurance options to
choose among. The DC health insurance plan can be designed so that the
employer reduces the variance in its contribution for health insurance
across employees. This, in turn, makes it less likely that the health insurance
plan generates undesirable selection or retention effects. 
Changes in Retiree Health Insurance Offerings
U.S. companies have also moved away from offering retiree health insurance
coverage over time, as indicated in Table 1. Here we report the fraction
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of full-time private sector workers with health insurance coverage, where
the health insurance was also offered to retirees. In 1988, 45 (37) percent
of workers were in plans that provided beneWts to retirees under age 65
(Medicare eligible); this had fallen to 35 (34) percent by 1997. In addition,
the percentage of employees having to pay part of the cost of retiree health
insurance has also grown over time. Among workers with health insurance
coverage for retirees under age 65, the share of workers with retiree health
coverage completely paid for by the employer fell from 53 to 29 percent
between 1988 and 1997. The corresponding Wgures for coverage for Medi-
care eligible retirees are 54 percent and 32 percent.
A number of empirical studies have examined whether retiree health
insurance inXuences retirement patterns, and the majority concludes there
is a powerful effect. For instance Karoly and Rogowski (1994) Wnd that men
aged 55–62 with retiree health insurance coverage are 8 percentage points
more likely to retire early over a two-year period, a change equal to 50 per-
cent of the baseline probability. Other studies also Wnd that older workers
with retiree health coverage are more likely to retire early.5 To the extent
that retiree health insurance coverage is falling over time, this will reduce
companies’ ability to induce early retirement. This may be exacerbated to
the extent that the Medicare program experiences Wnancial shortfalls in
years to come.
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Table 1. Trends in Employee Participation in Company-Sponsored Medical Plans,
by Provision for Coverage After Retirement
Participation rates (%)
1988 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997
Under Age 65
With employer-paid 
retiree health
insurance coverage 45 41 43 44 36 35
Retiree contribution 21 21 23 27 25 22
Employer pays all 24 18 16 13 9 10
Not determinable <1 1 4 4 4 3
Age 65 and over
With employer-paid
retiree health 
insurance coverage 37 36 41 41 32 34
Retiree contribution 16 18 20 23 22 20
Employer pays all 20 17 17 14 6 11
Not determinable <1 1 4 4 4 3
Source: U.S. Department of Labor (various years). Includes full-time employees in medium
and large private establishments.
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Conclusions 
We have reviewed the theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of
pensions and health insurance on assorted dimensions of employee pro-
ductivity. As pensions continue to shift from DB to DC plans, we believe this
will have predictable effects on selection, retention, and retirement patterns.
First, since the DC is a more portable pension, employee retention rates
could fall. Second, DC plans present employees with a different type of
retirement income risk and may attract a different type of worker than a DB
plan. Third, linking retirement to capital market performance will make
retirement patterns more volatile, as they respond to stock market returns.
Last, including company stock in DC portfolios can improve productivity by
linking pay to company performance, but it also might make it more difW-
cult to induce retirement during slow economic periods. 
Changes in health insurance offerings will also have productivity effects.
As health care inXation rises, due partly to population aging, this will con-
tinue to spur employers’ interest in “deWned contribution” health plans
as distinct from the traditional deWned beneWt offerings. Some Wrms may
pull back from offering health plans at all, since doing so attracts certain
types of workers that may be problematic, the more heterogeneous the work-
force becomes. Additional research on how beneWt plans inXuence worker
productivity would be most fruitful. For example, relatively little is known
about the selection and retention effects of particular aspects of 401(k)
design, including matching rates, use of company stock, investment educa-
tion, and the like. It would also be interesting to better understand how the
shift from DB to DC plans will affect future retirement patterns. Finally, if
employers are less likely to offer, and pay for, active and retired worker
health insurance, it will be important to investigate alternative models for
coverage in the future. 
Notes
1. Curme and Even (1995) show that, controlling for other personal character-
istics, the probability of coverage by a DB plan is 14 percentage points lower for
workers who are borrowing-constrained than for those who are not. The effect of
borrowing constraints on DC coverage is not statistically signiWcant. 
2. For an analysis of the adequacy of retirement savings for the typical household
near retirement age, see Moore and Mitchell (2000).
3. Moreover, following the logic of Ippolito (1997), the high discounters (bad
workers) will accumulate the least in their 401(k) plans and will be the least able to
afford retirement at an early age. Offsetting this, however, is the fact that high dis-
counters may be willing to retire with a lower pension balance since they place a
lower value on their standard of living in the late years of life.
4. Gruber and Madrian (1994) imply that the “job-lock” associated with health in-
surance has been reduced by the 1985 Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act (COBRA). Prior to this act, more than twenty states had passed continuation of
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coverage laws legislation mandating employers to provide departing workers the
opportunity to purchased continued coverage for a limited period of time.
5. Blau and Gilleskie (1997) Wnd that retiree health insurance increases the job
exit rate by 26 percent to 80 percent of the baseline probability and Rogowski and
Karoly (2000) report that the upper-bound effect of retiree health insurance on exit
rates is 68 percent of the baseline probability. Using earlier data, Gustman and
Steinmeier (1994) Wnd a smaller impact of retiree health insurance; however,
Rogowski and Karoly (2000) suggest that their study underestimates the effect of
retiree health insurance due to measurement error in their eligibility for retiree
health measure.
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